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Abstract
Communication ethics is concerned with
the ways in which intersubjective rela-
tionships are constructed. It highlights
the tensions among determinations that
rule intersubjective contacts and the con-
stant reformulation of meaning frames
and forms of language that deﬁne both
interlocution and its context. This text
outlines the similarities and differences
between two conﬂicting approaches con-
cerning the use of everyday language as
a particularly privileged way of social
interaction. We shall ﬁrst consider the
Habermasian notion of an ideal situation
of communication, then shifting to the
problems concerning the power and in-
terests encapsulated in any communica-
tive exchange, following the perspective
of Bourdieu. It is worth mentioning that
an ethics of com- munication that intends
to evaluate the role played by interests
and language in the practical relationship
between subjects should approach condi-
tions under which, through a discursive
interaction in the public scope, individu-
als could reach an understanding regard-
ing their interests and needs.
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M
UCH of the theoretical discussion on ethics in the ﬁeld of Communica-
tion focuses on studies regarding deontological principles governing
practices of communication professionals (Esteves, 1998, 2003). However,
without disregard the importance of codes that drive the action and inter-
ests of these professionals, it is possible to afﬁrm that communication ethics
also concerns the ways in which intersubjective relationships are constructed.
Communication ethics highlights the tensions among determinations that rule
intersubjective contacts and the constant reformulation of meaning frames and
forms of language that deﬁne both interlocution and its context. The way by
which subjects try to associate their freedom of action and their own interests
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in order to respect other identities and interests is also related to the ethical
framework (Marques, 2009, 2011).
An ethics associated with current communication processes should con-
sider: a) operative modes of information production in the media, b) modes of
dissemination and critical appropriation of media messages, c) intersubjective
processes that try to uncover the perspective of each social actor involved in a
communicative action, linking him/her or not linking him/her to the perspec-
tive of everybody; d) communicative situations and relational contexts that
are created when subjects activate common elements of language to seek a
mutual understanding, and e) a self-interest that guides not only strategic ac-
tions seen as contrary to the collective good, but rather directs the discursive
engagement of actors with their peers; therefore, it has to be considered as a
central element of a communicative interaction.
Beyond these dimensions, it is worth mentioning that an ethics of com-
munication that intends to evaluate the role played by interests and language
in the practical relationship between subjects should approach conditions un-
der which, through a discursive interaction in the public scope, individuals
could reach an understanding regarding their interests and needs. Habermas in
The Theory of Communicative Action (1987) tried to build a discourse ethics
in order to demonstrate how the use of language is able to promote mutual
understanding and a provisional agreement between participants of practical
discussions from a collective assessment of common issues and private inter-
ests. For the author, ethics is associated with a personal horizon of interests,
choices, values, and worldviews, while the moral point of view adopted by
participants in a discussion refers to the enlargement of the subjective horizon
towards conﬂict resolutions and collective problems. The use of language in
an argumentative situation, according to Habermas, also confers to subjects
the ability to act rationally and, from their personal interests, choose alterna-
tive ways of action that favor the common good. In other words, subjects’
actions had not been foreseen or encompassed by previous rules, but they
would be the result of decisions morally constructed through discussion and
dialogue.
From the horizon of their respective self-understanding and understand-
ing of world, the different parties in dialogue refer to a moral point of view
allegedly shared, which leads to an ever increasing decentralization of sev-i
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eral perspectives under the symmetrical conditions of discourse (Habermas,
2004a, p. 316).
The excerpt above reinforces the fact that communicative actions are not
separated of particular interests of subjects in interlocution. On the contrary:
it is from the universe of unique insights and interests of those subjects that
an extended horizon of shared meanings can be established. However, one
can question how far the discussion is able to provide even parity conditions
of enunciation and expression, making difﬁcult the construction of strategies
for achieving particular proposes. And for that it is necessary to bring the
habermasian approach closer to another perspective that emphasizes power
dynamics that pass by communicative relations.
In this sense, the debate proposed in this paper aims to retrieve the reﬂec-
tion of Pierre Bourdieu on an “ethics of language use” strictly directed to the
success of the strategic action of subjects. According to Bourdieu the subject
acts and uses language following norms and logic of a given ﬁeld in order to
obtain a symbolic gain, thus reiterating principles that guide his/her particu-
lar choices. In this paper, we use “ﬁeld” according to the meaning proposed
by Bourdieu in many moments (1980a, 1980b) as a structured social space in
which actors in dispute which have a limited symbolic capital accumulated
during their social trajectory look for the best positions and bonus associated
with them.
Reﬂecting on the ethics and moral in the context of communication, we
can not overlook that both social actors and media actors act in contexts
markedbylargelycentralizedstructuresbasedonhierarchicalandasymmetric
structures of communication. We can not forget either that media agents are
linked to power structures that reproduce and renew, continuing a particular
habitus. In general, the so-called habitus is a system that orientates individu-
als in their choices. Thanks to it, members of a social group share principles
and deﬁnitions about their social reality. In other words, the habitus refers to a
series of pre-reﬂective arrangements for the practical behavior that guide peo-
ple in a peculiar sense in all aspects of their experiences (Bourdieu, 1980b).
A ﬁrst set of questions can be extracted from these considerations: could
interests of a media agent be considered the result of his/her autonomous
choice? Or do these interests coincide with interests of the ﬁeld in which
he/she is inserted? Would it be possible to think of an ethical conduct without
considering conditions and contexts of action of individuals?i
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In turn, in relation to intersubjective processes of rapprochement between
private and public interests, we note that the ethical and moral development
of contemporary societies needs to take into account how subjects discuss,
dialogue and negotiate their differences, interests, points of view, and needs.
By means of a pragmatic approach of language use as a form of practical
action for the search of mutual understanding, the theory of communicative
action of Habermas (1987), as noted above, can be considered an important
contribution to understand how individuals and groups question values and
foundations that anchor moral rules that join them from an ethical position,
combining individual interests and collective interests.
In general, the habermasian approach in current complex societies aims
to reﬂect on the ways through which it could be possible to connect demands
of a subjective nature linked to different conceptions of good life to moral de-
mands which concern to the way by which we establish relations with other
people in the search for respect and social recognition. In this context, the
notion of interest is often perceived as a synonymous of strategic, something
that may corrupt the interactive communication, making it less desirable to
promote something that can serve everybody. Thus, a second set of questions
encourages us to reﬂect: how to go from a particular interest to reach a gen-
eralizable interest built on public reasons (publicly acceptable) and guided to
the common good?
Facing these two problematic aspects, this text aims to develop a better
approach on the ethics of communication structured around the notion of in-
terests. The objective of this rapprochement of Habermas and Bourdieu is
not to point difﬁculties and impossibilities for the elaboration of equal con-
ditions of access to the communicative rationality and for an effective peer
participation in discussions and public dialogues. Our aim is to demonstrate
that notions of interests and self-interest are an essential component in the
building process for an understanding of subjects and therefore an ethics of
communication.
Themes of public deliberation and discourse ethics are not familiar to the
scenery of theoretical writings of Pierre Bourdieu. In fact, these concepts are
more associated with works of Jürgen Habermas, and their use by the French
thinker is minimal. Works of Bourdieu on linguistic interactions exist from
assumptions and they reach conclusions far from studies on the pragmatics
of language developed by Habermas: it would be possible, when we ask oni
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Bourdieu’s concerns about the ethics of language, simply reply that he doesn’t
deal with this issue.
However, in his books and papers on this subject there seems to be a “dis-
course ethics” that does not risk revealing its name. But it is not possible
to go far in this transplant of concepts between both shores of the Rhine: a
rapprochement between Habermas and Bourdieu would require a space and
a breath considerably larger than the limits of this text. Even the mutual ab-
sence of quotations can be considered an indication that considerations of one
of them were beyond a conceptual map of the other.
At ﬁrst, and based on assumptions developed by Bourdieu, we will have
out a reﬂection on possibilities of exploration of an ethics of language use.
In a second step, we intend to explore another aspect of the ethics of com-
munication from Habermas: the way by which communicative interactions
may establish passages between individual and collective interests according
to practical processes of discussion on topics morally relevant to everybody.
The question that guides both moments, as explained in the introduction, is
about the possibility and conditions of an ethics of discussion, considering the
interests of social actors involved.
ChancesofadiscussionamongequalsinBoudieu’swrit-
ings
Pierre Bourdieu devoted several writings and at least one book, Ce que
parler veut dire (1982), reworked years later under the title Langage et pou-
voir symbolique (2001), published in Brazil with the title A economia das tro-
cas linguísticas (1992), as well as some sparse texts joined later in Questions
de Sociologie (1980a) and Choses Dites (1987). If, as stated above, questions
of discourse ethics and deliberation seem to be unrelated to reﬂections of the
French sociologist, on the other hand, in his studies he presented interest for
the practical conditions of language use in a society - thus suggesting a con-
cern with an ethics of language.
Without intending to establish here a theoretical discussion, or even a
more detailed presentation of Bourdieu concepts (1980b, 2001), it is worth
recalling brieﬂy some conceptual frameworks from which this part of the text
will be developed.i
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Linguistic interactions for Bourdieu (2001) occur not only as an exchange
of propositions and meanings between speakers. Seeking to rescue the socio-
logical element in language analysis to do not accomplish a linguistic analysis
of social actions, the French author seeks to pursue social elements present in
the dialogue. Conversation is seen as a social activity undertaken by historical
subjects constituted within a ﬁeld.
In this scenery, what Bourdieu (2000) named as habitus plays a funda-
mental role: a set of practices, perceptions, preferences, and other provisions
internalized by the subject throughout his social existence. As a principle
that generates daily practices but is also inﬂuenced by them, hence there is
a constant relation with the society, the habitus is presented as an “invisible
master” responsible at the same time for perceptual, cognitive, and practical
dimensions of the subject. The habitus reveals itself especially in the seem-
ingly unmotivated, obvious and natural action according to the view of those
who practice it (Bourdieu, 2000, 1982; Barros & Martino, 2003; Martino,
2003).
When the individual talks, he/she makes use of components of his/her
linguistic habitus, also due to the “linguistic capital” accumulated until that
moment (and not represented just by a vocabulary of some speciﬁcity, but also
the correction of language) that will be objectiﬁed as a “discourse” within a
ﬁeld (Martino, 2003). The peers will assign a value to this discourse, resulting
in the classiﬁcation of the speaker according to the ﬁeld taxonomy and from
which he will be recognized. By naming linguistic interactions as “linguistic
exchanges” or even “linguistic market”, Bourdieu (2001) draws attention to
this dimension of relation between discourse and power that is inserted in it
as a result of his/ her social connections.
The social production of discourse is thus presented as the starting point
for its understanding. Language for Bourdieu can not be detached from its
social origins: it is not conﬁgured only as a mean used by speakers in equal
positions for the free exchange of meanings. Both in discussion as in the
speech, the possibilities to speak and the mutual recognition of the speciﬁc
value of each speech are at stake. If, in a discourse ethics of habermasian
approach we can perceive the exploration of mutual recognition of the right to
speak as a sine qua non determination, Bourdieu (2001) suggests that the very
recognition of this right also aims at the recognition of inequalities presented
in this right to the speech. The “right to speak”, if assured by law in legali
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proceedings, becomes more ﬂuid in daily interactions where the law of force -
represented by the mutual position of speakers – is presented as an obstacle to
interaction. The consensus arising from a discussion can be obtained, with no
doubt, but not without taking a path cleaved of objectivities and disclosures
of ﬁeld structures on which rights to speech and reasoning are established and
delimited, as well as the recognition of such an argument as a “valid” and
“rational” one.
Regulatory elements for an ethics of language use according to Bourdieu
are outside the discourse. Or it would be better to say “at the intersection”
of the discourse itself. Validity claims of any one discourse is guaranteed, at
least in a important dimension, for elements outside the discourse itself, but
present in it due to the incorporation by the speaker of rules that legitimize the
discourse. Thus, to everyutterancethe linguistic performance of a participant
in a given ﬁeld and in a usual situation is able to produce a legitimizable
discourse to which possibilities of such a discourse are recognized as valid
are already incorporated.
Just a discourse produced in situations beyond the speaker habitus that
would require the calculation of reconstruction for this same habitus to ac-
count for a new circumstance would need a new evaluation and structuring
of validity claims for this same discourse. It is impossible for the speaker fa-
miliarized with the social space in which he/she will apply his/her discourse
in circulation to do not use elements that are presented as rules of language
use, that means, an ethos. Could we notice here some echoes of an “discourse
ethics”? Insofar this ethos is erected in its habitus, this allows in advance the
recognition and unintentional calculation of elements that concede legitimacy
to a particular discussion.
Thus, anyuseofdiscoursecontrarytothisethosand, therefore, thatbreaks
an ethics of language use would try to be recognized by the speaker as being
exogenous to the own system of elaboration of linguistic action. Understand-
ing the speech act from Bourdieu (1980a) as the objectiﬁcation of a linguistic
habitus acquired throughout the individual’s social trajectory, only the cost of
a very advanced calculation could break the ethical rules of discourse once
they are incorporated and try to deﬁne the recognition by the speaker himself
regarding the axiological and cognitive characteristics of his speaking.
At this point, all discourse is ethical within the consecrated ethos lim-
its of a social space. But chances of a speech to be validated from normsi
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speciﬁed by rules of a consensual practical reason - what Bourdieu (1980a,
2001) understands as “linguistic habitus” - as the basis of a dialogical pro-
cess of debate would be subject to an inquiry from the examination of genesis
of criteria responsible to consider as “rational” some particular argumentative
action, which gives it a status position from which the validity of propositions
is determined.
In other words, the question would be to verify who - obviously this is not
an individual subject, but a social “agent” – was able to identify a pattern of
use of discourse as “rational” against “non-rational” ones and, more impor-
tantly, how a particular discourse was perceived as having characteristics that
qualify it as “rational” in opposition to others - an opposition also deﬁned in
hierarchical terms in the constitution of social formations of a ﬁeld (Martino,
2010). In general, a ﬁeld is a structured space of relations in which agents in
dispute seek hegemony and symbolic proﬁt, it is possible to argue that there
is small space for ethics (Bourdieu, 1982, 2000).
In this case we are not claiming that the validity of a discourse - a concept
that, in this part of the text can be viewed as the “use of language” according
to Catherine Balsey (2002) - is given solely by exogenous criteria. What we
try to stress is that the presence of elements in a discourse which ensure its
validity is linked to the conditions of its formulation. It would be possible
to indicate some circularity of the argument: a discourse is ethically valid
because it is produced according to rules that ensure its validity. However,
the dynamic characteristic of the habitus, an element in permanent rebuilding,
“structuring structure” and at the same time a “structured structure”, leads
to an equally dynamic in the formulation of the discourse, that requires in
any dialogue the participant perception regarding immediate action data to the
argumentative reciprocity within standards established by the circumstances
in order to ensure the continued validity of his/her arguments against a speaker
in a real situation of interaction.
Oncetheelementsthatimmediatelyconstitutethepracticalreasontosome
social space are deﬁned interactions considered as valid use to be produced
by agents from a normativity incorporated in the form of habitus in this ﬁeld.
Those agents pervades the discourse of its own validity rules, reducing the
possibility of performance of speech acts unrelated to this ethos, that is, with-
out elements responsible for its recognition as valid by the other participants
of the interaction (Martino, 2010).i
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Then, linguistic exchange exists as a speech act within a social space that
will ﬁnd resonance in these same objectifying acts, even involuntary, for state-
ments and ethical principles of the ﬁeld in which they are pronounced.
Thus we believe that a prospect of elaboration for a normative standard
of guarantee of possibility of a linguistic interaction, a reﬂection that would
be done from the standpoint of a sociology of language use, is related to the
establishment of the legitimacy of a discourse within a particular social space.
It is the aim of seeking explicit conditions of a “validity of discussion” by
examining the constitution of those conditions - if it is possible to make a
wordplay, this is to ask who validated rules of validity of a discourse.
The answer according to the interpretation proposed here from the per-
spective of Bourdieu’s sociology could be drawn when one considers that the
production of criteria of legitimacy of a discourse are linked to social spaces
of use of such a discourse, as well as the trajectory of agents of this space.
Social spaces according to Bourdieu (1980b) are endowed with a narrative
that consists of their conﬂicts, disputes, and confrontations between agents by
imposing hegemonic elements of cognitive and axiological validation of prac-
tices regarded as valid ones. Internal and external dynamic of ﬁelds allows
a continuous redeﬁnition of these elements according to multifactorial condi-
tions that convert at the intersection of agent trajectories, moments of higher
orthodoxy or heterodoxy, the success and incorporation in the core dispute
of agents hitherto marginal. Finally, of a dynamic all its own that, somehow,
becomes part of the ﬁeld dynamic.
This way, in our view the diachronic ﬁeld genesis becomes the structural
synchrony of conditions such as proposed by dominants - which does not
mean they are fully accepted by agents in dominated positions, but anyway
they serve for establishing an image, both internally and reﬂective of the ﬁeld.
So, what is synchronously validated in the ﬁeld tends to be viewed as “univer-
sally valid”.
Which are the chances for a resolution from this perspective? A ﬁrst an-
swer could be “nothing” to the extent that, as indicated earlier in this text, as
far as we know the proposal for an “economy of linguistic exchanges” accord-
ing to Bourdieu simply is not talking about it.
However, in our view, eliminating the possibility of exit from a discussion
may not do justice to the author perspectives in the sense that the very linguis-
tic activity is seen as a political act of interference - and this doesn’t accepti
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a deterministic reading of its conceptions of "ﬁeld" and habitus, but think-
ing about possibilities of setting up counter-hegemonies and even counter-
hegemonic or marginal discourses within a given ﬁeld to the extent that, as a
social space, it is not immune to changes and alterations in the society itself.
This way, the very activity of language within a ﬁeld can be thought of as an
element of challenge, not just acceptance.
Notions of habitus and ﬁeld as well as those of “linguistic market” help
thinking about possibilities of setting up public arenas for debates as well as
chances of success of each participant. A doubt about possibilities of a "lin-
guistic equality" among participants in a dialogue, to the extent this dialogue
is not detached from social hierarchies in which it is formulated, but exactly
due to this, it can serve as an aid to the perception of these hierarchies, their
objectiﬁcation, and subsequent transformation.
It would perhaps be a challenge to think how far these equality conditions
would be formed paradoxically by deconstructing the discourse of equality
from an examination of ﬁeld logics and, from there, they would allow a legit-
imate confrontation of interests in a public arena constituted by agents with
a look of self-reﬂection that eventually could allow undoing the illusio of a
certain “linguistic communism”.
Also, the replacement of it by a sense of how differences in language
linked to social differences can - or have to, under a certain perspective - be
confronted in order to establish the same chances of a discussion between
"equals" - and note - "equals" because they are aware of conditions in which
the discourse takes place, without necessarily being caught speciﬁcally to this
or that condition which, as being pre-established without the awareness of
participants, erects itself on a “natural” condition in a discourse formulation.
At this point, it would be possible to suggest that an ethics of language use
is possible only when one transcends dynamic structures of ﬁeld from their
own objectiﬁcation as embodied practices and recognized by the participating
subjects, but also freely deliberate - and "freely" does not mean an absolute
freedom, but within parameters thought several times by Habermas (1987),
which, as proposed, can be connected to issues raised to date under the sign
of Bourdieu.i
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Communicativeaction, discourseethics, andtensionbe-
tween private interest and the collective good
The communicative action aims at a mutual understanding of subjects
about something that belongs to the objective, social, and subjective worlds.
It points to how the discourse becomes a central element of building decisions
able to, from the public consideration of particular arguments, constitute not
only a common basis for agreements reached around generalizable elements,
identiﬁed from the collective assessment of needs and particular interests. De-
spite the strategic and communicative actions are presented as two genuine
types of interaction, only one of them can be considered able to produce ra-
tionally motivated agreements.
I refer to communicative actions when social interactions are coordinated
not through egocentric calculations of success accomplished by particular in-
dividuals, but by means of cooperative conquest of understanding among par-
ticipants. In communicative action participants are not oriented primarily for
their own success, but to achieve an agreement that is the condition for all par-
ticipants could pursue and achieve their own plans (Habermas, 1982, p.264).
The communicative action indicates the process through which individ-
uals would imply discursive exchanges that happen in several situations in
order to produce information in a collective and reciprocal way, confronting
their arguments and seeking appropriate alternatives to problems they face in
their daily lives (Gomes and Maia, 2008; Page, 1996; Gastil, 2008; Marques,
2008). This process acquires concreteness through debate or public deliber-
ation through which individuals and groups learn to deﬁne problems, to ne-
gotiate their interests, to seek solutions that ﬁt a collectivity, to claim rights
and achieve a status of a politically autonomous and valued citizen (Bohman,
2009; Habermas, 2004a). Conversely, “in the strategic action, participants
assume that everyone decides in a self-centered manner according to the dis-
cretion of his/her own interests” (Habermas, 1989, p.8). In this type of instru-
mental relationship, others are only means or obstacles to the achievement of
an action plan drawn by a single individual.
When Habermas emphasizes social circumstances of communication in
which agents seek – cooperatively and without any form of coercion or con-
straint (ideals which ignore social, economic, and political dissimilarities a-i
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mong the speakers) – to reach an understanding, it seems that no strategic
form of action or any self-centered perspective can be a part of that context.
However, as he has afﬁrmed, it is a mistake to exclude the strategic dimension
of subjects’ actions once inﬂuencing our interlocutors in an interaction is part
of the negotiation process or production of justiﬁcations for our arguments.
What would be disastrous for discursive interactions that aim to better under-
stand collective problems is that speakers hide their intentions and refuse to
justify reasons that are behind their interests, making interaction a game in
which the principle of advertising (visibility) is disregarded in favor of rules
and hidden objectives.
According to Habermas, the discourse or a rational discussion is able to
connect private and public, morality and justice, individual interests and col-
lective interests. This would be, in the context of pluralistic societies, the
only way to collectively interpret our interests, “in order to discover or cre-
ate, despite our differences, a common ground” (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p.
368). Under this bias, we can keep in mind that the discourse is an ideal way
to discuss issues of concern to the community by requiring that participants
realize their counterparts not as obstacles to be circumvented for the achieve-
ment of particular goals (strategic action), but as partners worthy of respect,
understood as autonomous agents with moral capacity to prepare and pub-
licly defend their own positions based on arguments and reasons (Chambers,
1996).
A reﬂective discussion, according to Habermas, enable us to express our
desires, feelings, and needs to recognize which ones belong to the realm of
personal discernment and which ones should be shared and understood as
belonging to the collective context of justice, rules, and rights.
Some critics of Habermas, especially Thompson (1998) and feminists like
Young (2001) and Fraser (1989, 1990) argue that such ideal conditions of dis-
cussion generate the understanding that Habermas might be neglecting indi-
vidual concerns of subjects to universalize what barely could be generalized:
parameters of perception of the world constituted by subjective experiences
and subjective interests consisting of a particular worldview and a willingness
to question and put on the agenda some speciﬁc topics and not others.
It is after building the foundation of discourse ethics that Habermas ex-
plores in a more recurrent way the issue of collective interests and self-interest
in particular. To explain the operation of discourse ethics it is necessary toi
i
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resume the distinction that Habermas proposed between ethical questions of
good life and moral issues of justice. The ﬁrst ones are related to individual
and private decisions on actions to be taken and on the formation of particu-
lar identities. As for moral issues, they would be linked to the regulation of
conﬂicts between different levels of contradictory interests, considering what
is good for all.
On the one hand, ethical issues include the respect we have for ourselves
and eventually the respect that others have for us. On the other hand, moral
issues would deal with “the symmetric respect that each one demonstrates
by the integrity of others” (Habermas, 1989, p. 9). But this symmetric re-
spect can just be built if each individual from his/her own experience imagine
himself/herself in another’s place, perceiving the other people as worthy of
respect. For this, it is necessary some empathy, we need to see the history of
other person as connected to my own history, the other person interests linked
to my own interests.
According to Mansbridge (2005), after talking and discussing with other
people with whom we have differences of interests, we can understand the
price for obtaining what is good for them, the practical constraints of their
wishes, possible solutions for their dilemmas and what they appreciate more
deeply. In such cases, conﬂict and search for understanding are intertwined.
As we will see later, the denial of the presence of self-interest in the process
of discussion on issues of collective interest can often prevent the formation
of connections of empathy, solidarity, and mutual respect.
Given this situation, ethics and moral meet themselves when the consider-
ation on what is good for all requires that we understand what others consider
“good.” In this respect, Habermas ﬁrstly asserts that ethics is not guided by
“a self-centered limitation regarding individual preferences, but it provides a
reference to a life history that is always linked to intersubjectively shared tra-
ditions and ways of life” (2004a, p. 40). The argumentative evaluation of
moral issues always remains connected to the personal perspective (which is
determined by my self-understanding). It depends, then, on the capacity of
subjects to approach their particular life histories to the life histories of others
with whom they share a common symbolic and cultural scenery (Habermas,
1989). That is, individual interests are placed on the background of culture
and life world in order to originate “generalizable interests” potentially share-
able by all.i
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Discourse (or discussion) ethics aims to promote inclusive discursive pro-
cedures so that all those potentially affected by an issue could express their
needs and interests in order to reach a common point of view. In other words,
it is based on the maxim (inspired by the categorical principle of Kant) that
laws and rules can only be valid in a moral sense when they are freely ac-
cepted by all participants in the discourse in order to reﬂect a generalizable
interest (Habermas, 2004a).
It is important to highlight that procedures of generalization of perspec-
tives and needs do not require the elimination of speciﬁcities or the forgetting
of ethical problem of living well, but they mention the discourse as a trans-
formative moral process that allows us an approximation with the universe of
“other person”, allowing the emergence of new links and new interests. Under
this bias, participants in a dialogue do not let aside their private situations and
desires to follow a universal and shared point of view. They simply move from
a position that focuses on their personal needs towards an attitude of recog-
nition of demands of other people. In this interpretation, these demands are
generalizable once they “can be recognized without violating rights of others
or subject them to domination” (Young, 1990, p. 107).
The major problem is that, in general, the search for a unit in preferences
can lead to both suppression of singular experiments regarding the afﬁrmation
and prevalence of dominant interests (Fraser, 1990; Young, 2001). And none
of these consequences favor the transformation of points of view; rather they
promote their reiﬁcation.
When is a private interest important for a public de-
bate?
In situations of deadlock and dissension, both collective and private inter-
ests need to be brought up in deliberative procedures rather than being entirely
ignored. In these circumstances, it is necessary to incorporate the private in-
terest to the debate, since its cancellation in favor of a “we” or a collective
interest prevents participants of clarifying their interests (Fraser, 1990).
Mansbridgeetal. (2010)believethatthepublicexpressionofprivateinter-
ests to be negotiated bring positive contributions to the deliberative process,
expanding the possibilities of understanding between interlocutors. Firstly,i
i
i
i
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for the participants of a deliberation could know what is good for them, they
need to consider which interests each one brings to the debate, reﬂecting to-
gether on their preferences, values, and interests. Thus, in deliberative sit-
uations that combine common interests and conﬂicts of interest, a ﬁrst step
to be taken would be to impel participants to talk with themselves, trying to
understand their own interests. As stated by Mansbridge (2005), members
of subordinated groups need to develop ideas and counter-hegemonic under-
standings of their interests. This process only occurs when these members
ﬁnd a space for deliberation that could be free of sanctions and that allows
questioning and challenging the dominant view. In general, people need this
kind of interaction to examine each other and ﬁnd what they believe to be their
“real” interests. Even in a deliberation that seeks to establish a consensus on
common good, the exploration and clariﬁcation of personal interests should
be taken into consideration.
Women, for example, have been socialized in order to put interests of oth-
ers always ahead of their own interests, and this affects the way they interpret
their own interests. The articulation of self-interest has a legitimate role in
democratic deliberation, particularly in discussions of distributive justice. A
legitimate self-determination should include the criterion to help citizens to
understand better their interests, being those interests forged either aiming at
the common good or not (Mansbridge, 2009, p. 229).
Under this bias, the inclusion of personal interest in the deliberative pro-
cess introduces pieces of information that facilitate the attainment of reason-
able solutions, involves a diversity of opinions and goals, generates the clariﬁ-
cation and processing of preferences, and also reveal that apparent differences
can hide the defense of a same concern regarding common good. In this pro-
cess of clariﬁcation, participants of deliberation should be able to “explore
and question what they really want and what is good and right for them, as
for others, in a way that it does not suppress the interests of this reﬂection”
(Mansbridge et al., 2010, p. 73). In this way, conﬂict and collective reﬂection
on interests of each one can produce both self-understanding and mutual un-
derstanding. Without it, it is possible that what is deﬁned as a common good,
an objective of all communicative action, is imposed by those that hold higher
inﬂuence power.
Therefore, we consider a mistake to exclude the self-interest of interac-
tional processes on behalf of ideal of impartiality that can cause more harmi
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
16 Luis Mauro Sá Martino, Ângela Cristina Salgueiro Marques
than help the understanding between interlocutors (Marques, 2009, 2011).
Impartiality is revealed as an extremely restrictive criterion for deliberative
processes, preventing the construction of a nuanced understanding of speci-
ﬁcities of social context and the particular needs that people want to express.
The ideal of fairness reﬂects the ethical attempt of the habermasian discourse
to reach a moral standpoint, that is, a view that starts from individual hori-
zons of subjects to achieve an expanded horizon. But as pointed out by Young
(1990, p. 100), “the construction of a neutral point of view is accomplished
through the abstraction of the concrete particularity of the subject at issue.”
If the ethics of communication is based on the expanding of individual
ethical horizons considering issues that pertain to what is good for everyone,
it is necessary to seek ways to reconcile interests and particular needs, which
emerge in partial public scopes of interaction of groups and individuals with
concerns related to those that integrate current societies that are highly com-
plex, pluralistic, and differentiated.
Final Considerations
The ethical dimension of communication is commonly associated with
the operation of strategic media devices and the performance of their employ-
ees in front of the constraint imposed by powers associated with the Market
and the State. While we have to take into account the several ambiguities
and inequalities present in the operating modes of the media and their pro-
fessionals, it is also necessary to consider that an ethics of communication
encompasses rules, norms, and values that regulate interaction practices in the
everyday life. Thus, the ethics of communication is not restricted to practices
that implement and renew the imperatives of performativity and effectiveness
of the media, but we need to take into account “the mutual linguistic under-
standing: communication organized from the language, by which individuals
socially constitute themselves as subjects and common life becomes possible”
(Esteves, 2003, p. 146).
We saw that although we can discuss an ethics of language use in Bour-
dieu, what stands out in the reﬂections of this author is a research about prac-
tical conditions of language use within the possibilities provided in advance
by the ﬁeld and the habitus in which subjects in interaction are located. Fori
i
i
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Bourdieu, the subject acts and uses language in accordance with strategies
that do not contradict the logic of the ﬁeld, and its action intends to achieve
the higher symbolic proﬁt, in an attempt to reafﬁrm limits and principles that
guide his/her choices. Thus, individuals constituted within a ﬁeld act for an
interest (which is not personal, but presented as personal) to accumulate sym-
bolic capital and achieve success.
There are numerous discrepancies between the approaches of Habermas
and Bourdieu. Broadly speaking, while the discourse ethics erases inequities
on behalf of an ideal community of communication, studies of Bourdieu seek
to bring to the center of reﬂection social differences and multiple tensions
which mark the production of social discourses. If, for Habermas, what guar-
antees the validity of discourses and utterances is the public exchange of rea-
sons among individuals located on the same cultural background and value,
for Bourdieu rules of the ﬁeld, as previously deﬁned and rooted in the actions
of individuals, are able to determine this validity beforehand. The table below
synthesizes the main differences between both approaches:
Despite these asymmetries noted, it is necessary to seek ways to recon-
cile interests and particular needs which emerge in interaction situations of
groups and individuals with concerns related to those that integrate the highly
complex, pluralistic, and differentiated societies of today. All interaction sit-
uations are arranged around interests of interlocutors, whether established in
social spaces that are constrained to predeﬁned rules or in situations where
rules are not deﬁned until the moment of the interaction itself. The interest
of agents is not incompatible with an ethic of discussion, nor is something
only related to the strategic action of interaction partners. It is an integral
part of the building of a communicative moment and the condition of mutual
understanding: if there is not interest, there is not participation in the debate.
An ethics of communication needs to take into account that the discursive
arenas in which we participate are located in a broad social context permeated
by structural relations of domination and subordination. Moreover, such an
ethics can not ignore that subjects act both in accordance with rules aimed at
fairness (requiring a brief suspension of differences and domination modes)
and according to procedures considered as legitimate and valued by a given
system of orientation.
Then, it is essential to bear in mind that the ethics of communication is
constituted when we analyze the interlocutory situation in all its dimensions:i
i
i
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Habermas Bourdieu
Ethics Ethics is present in ratio-
nal discussion oriented to
understanding.
Ethics is part of the habitus
embodied by the agent in a
particular ﬁeld.
Pragma-
tics/Uses of
language
Communicative action is
characterized as a rela-
tionship between inter-
locutors equally able to
use reason.
Possibilities for use of words
are linked to the position of an
agent in the ﬁeld. There is no
equality in language use.
Interests
involved
in the
discourse
Interests of participants
are clear in the discourse
and they are inserted in
the rational discourse
aiming at the discussion
towards understanding
and the formulation of a
generalizable interest.
Interests are not explicit.
Sometimes they are unknown
of participants because they
are not understood as an
“interest” - the participants
themselves.
Validity of
discourse
Free and rational use of
language aiming at the va-
lidity of a discourse; the
pretension of validity of
discourse is established as
a premise by interlocu-
tors.
The validity of a discourse is
given by its inter pares le-
gitimacy. Each ﬁeld in its
dynamicredeﬁnes continually
“legitimate” and “marginal”
discourses.
Ethics of
Communi-
cation/Dis-
cussion/Dis-
course
Ethics in communication
is linked to the equal pos-
sibility of participation of
people interested in dis-
cussion.
Ethics in communication is
the appropriateness of actions
of a communicator regarding
procedures deﬁned as “ethi-
cal” by the ﬁeld.
from discursive exchange to the constitution of agonistic and unequal space of
production of dialogue, access to language and distribution of linguistic roles
among subjects.i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
Promises and limits of discourse ethics in communicative interactions 19
References
BALSEY, Catherine. Critical Practice. Londres: Routledge, 2002.
BARROS FILHO, C. E MARTINO, L. M. S. O habitus na comunicação. São
Paulo: Paulus, 2003.
BOHMAN, James. O que é a deliberação pública? Uma abordagem dialóg-
ica. In: MARQUES, Angela Cristina Salgueiro. (Org.). A Deliberação
Pública e suas dimensões sociais, políticas e comunicativas: textos fun-
damentais. 1 ed. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2009, p.31-84.
BOURDIEU, Pierre. Questions de Sociologie. Paris: Minuit, 1980a.
BOURDIEU, Pierre. Le Sens Pratique. Paris: Minuit, 1980b.
BOURDIEU, Pierre. Ce que parler veut dire. Paris: Minuit, 1982.
BOURDIEU, Pierre. Choses Dites. Paris: Minuit, 1987.
BOURDIEU, Pierre. A economia das trocas simbólicas. 3. ed. São Paulo:
Perspectiva, 1992.
BOURDIEU, Pierre. Raisons pratiques. Paris: Seuil, 2000.
BOURDIEU Pierre. Langage et pouvoir symbolique. Paris : Seuil, 2001.
CHAMBERS, Simone (1996). Reasonable Democracy – Jürgen Habermas
and the Politics of Discourse. London: Cornell University Press.
COHEN, Joshua. Deliberação e Legitimidade Democrática. In: MARQUES,
Angela Cristina Salgueiro. (Org.). A Deliberação Pública e suas dimen-
sões sociais, políticas e comunicativas: textos fundamentais. 1 ed. Belo
Horizonte: Autêntica, 2009.
COHEN, Jean; ARATO, Andrew (1992). Discourse Ethics and Civil Society.
In: COHEN, J. ARATO, A. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, pp.345-420.
ESTEVES, João Pissarra (2003). Media, Comunicação e Moral Comunica-
cional. In: _____. Espaço Público e Democracia: comunicação, pro-
cessos de sentido e identidades sociais. Rio Grande do Sul: Unisinos,
pp.143-168.
ESTEVES, João Pissarra (1998). A ética da comunicação e os media moder-
nos: legitimidade e poder nas sociedades complexas. Lisboa: Fundação
Calouste Gulbenian.i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
20 Luis Mauro Sá Martino, Ângela Cristina Salgueiro Marques
FRASER, Nancy. “Struggle over needs: outline of a socialist-feminist critical
theory of late capitalist political culture”. In: Unruly Practices: power,
discourse, and gender in contemporary social theory. Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp.161-187.
FRASER, Nancy. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: a contribution to the cri-
tique of actually existing democracy”, Social Text, No. 25/26, 1990, pp.
56-80.
GASTIL, John (2008). Political Communication and Deliberation. London:
Sage.
GOMES, Wilson; MAIA, Rousiley (2008). Comunicação e Democracia:
problemas e perspectivas. São Paulo: Paulus.
HABERMAS, Jürgen. A Inclusão do Outro: estudos de teoria política. 2a
Ed. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2004a.
HABERMAS, Jürgen. Racionalidade do entendimento mútuo. In: Verdade e
Justiﬁcação, São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2004b.
HABERMAS, Jürgen. Para o uso pragmático, ético e moral da razão prática.
Estud. av.. 1989, vol.3, n.7, pp. 4-19.
HABERMAS, Jürgen. Conhecimento e Interesse. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Za-
har, 1983.
HABERMAS, Jürgen. A ética da discussão e a questão da verdade. São
Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2007.
HABERMAS, Jürgen (1987). The Theory of communicative action: vol.II
Lifeworld and system: a critique of functionalism reason. Boston: Bea-
con Press.
HABERMAS, Jürgen (1982). A Reply to my Critics. In: THOMPSON, J. B.,
HELD, D. (eds.). Habermas: critical debates. Cambridge: MIT Press,
pp.219-283.
MANSBRIDGE, Jane. Conﬂict and Self-Interest in Deliberation. Paper pre-
sented at Granada IVR workshop on deliberative democracy and its dis-
contents, on 25 and 27 May, 2005.
MANSBRIDGE, Jane. A conversação cotidiana no sistema deliberativo. In:
MARQUES, Angela Cristina Salgueiro. (Org.). A Deliberação Pública e
suas dimensões sociais, políticas e comunicativas: textos fundamentais.
1 ed. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2009.i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
Promises and limits of discourse ethics in communicative interactions 21
MANSBRIDGE,Jane; BOHMAN,James; CHAMBERS,Simone; ESTLUND,
David; FOLLESDAL, Andreas; FUNG, Archon; LAFONT, Cristina;
MANIN, Bernard; MARTÍ, José. “The place of self-interest and the role
of power in deliberative democracy”, The Journal of Political Philoso-
phy, v.18, n.1, 2010, p.64-100.
MARQUES, Ângela. O papel dos interesses na construção de uma ética dos
processos comunicativos. Lumina (UFJF. Online), v. 5, p. 1-18, 2011.
MARQUES, Ângela. Ética do discurso e deliberação mediada sobre a questão
das cotas raciais. Líbero (FACASPER), v. 13, p. 75-89, 2010.
MARQUES, Ângela. As relações entre ética, moral e comunicação em três
âmbitos da experiência intersubjetiva. Logos (UERJ. Impresso), v. 31,
p. 51-63, 2009.
MARQUES, Ângela. L’intersection entre le processus communicatif et la
délibération publique. Les Enjeux de l’Information et de la Communica-
tion, v. 9, p. 1-12, 2008.
MARTINO, L. M. S. Mídia e Poder Simbólico São Paulo: Paulus, 2003.
MARTINO, L. M. S. A ética como estratégia no campo jornalístico. Líbero,
v. 13, p. 75-89, 2010.
PAGE, Benjamin (1996). Who deliberates ? Mass Media in Modern Democ-
racy. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press.
THOMPSON, John. A Mídia e a Modernidade: uma teoria social da mídia.
Petrópolis: Vozes, 1998.
YOUNG, Iris. Comunicação e o outro: além da democracia deliberativa. In:
J. Souza, Democracia hoje: novos desaﬁos para a teoria democrática
contemporânea, Brasília, Editora da UnB, 2001, pp. 365-386.
YOUNG, Iris. Justice and the politics of difference. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990.